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1. Introduction
The general purpose of tax treaties is to implement the
consensus underlying the international tax regime by shifting
the right to tax passive income from the source to the residence
country, and by limiting the ability of source countries to tax
active income to income attributable to a permanent
establishment.3 Article 7 of the OECD MC implements this
latter function by stating that a contracting state may not tax
business profits arising therein unless they are attributable to a
permanent establishment (PE, as defined in Article 5 OECD
MC).
A priori, one would expect Article 7 not to play a very
important role in modern treaty practice, because most crossborder business profits are earned by multinational enterprises
(MNEs), and MNEs generally operate in host countries via
subsidiaries, rather than via branches. Thus, one would expect
that most practical issues in the allocation of business income
would be governed by Article 9 OECD MC, which addresses
parent-subsidiary transactions, rather than by Article 7.
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However, a series of recent developments have led to a renewed
emphasis on Article 7, as evidenced by the publication last year
of a major OECD report on the attribution of profits to
permanent establishments.4 These developments include the rise
of electronic commerce, which has made it easier to sell
products into countries without using a subsidiary or a PE; the
increasing importance of financial services and global trading,
which is frequently conducted via branches; and the
proliferation of tax planning using PE structures, such as U.S.
planning relying on check the box. In addition, various countries
have taken aggressive approaches to finding that a PE exists,
such as recent cases that find that a subsidiary is in fact a
dependent agent PE.5
In reaction to these developments, the OECD Report advocates
an “authorised OECD approach” to the interpretation of Article
7, which incorporates by analogy the concepts developed under
Article 9 and the Transfer Pricing Guidelines: “the authorised
OECD approach is that the profits to be attributed to are the
profits that the PE would have earned at arm’s length if it were a
legally distinct and separate enterprise performing the same or
similar functions under the same or similar conditions,
determined by applying the arm’s length principle under Article
7(2).” 6
As Richard Vann has pointed out, the problem with this
approach is that it assumes that the Article 9/Transfer Pricing
Guidelines are working well, and therefore treating PEs as if
they were subsidiaries would solve the problem. 7 However, an
4
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extensive literature has established that the Transfer Pricing
Guidelines are not working well, and are in need of reform.8
Thus, we believe that the Article 7 problem must be
reconsidered from first principles.
2. What Is The Right Way to Tax MNEs at Source?
The OECD Report states that its recommendation “was not
constrained by either the original intent or by the historical
practice and interpretation of Article 7.” 9 Moreover, the Report
recommends a redrafting of both the Article itself and the
Commentary. 10 Given this, it seems appropriate to begin by
asking: If we were working on a clean slate, what would be the
best way to tax MNEs at source in the light of 21st century
business practices?
The beginning point has to be that a modern MNE does not
operate as if its constituent units, either subsidiaries or branches,
deal with each other as if they were separate enterprises.
Instead, a modern MNE is generally a single, unified enterprise,
managed from a central location by managers who are
responsible to their shareholders for the results of the MNE as a
whole.
The current approach to taxing MNEs at source is based on
separate accounting (SA), or treating each entity within the
MNE as a separate taxpayer. This approach is problematic for a
variety of reasons. First, the system is not suited to the global
nature of international business. In particular, international
production processes make the SA system of assigning profit to
specific geographic destinations inherently arbitrary. Further,
8

See, e.g., Reuven Avi-Yonah, The Rise and Fall of Arm's Length: A Study in the Evolution of U.S.
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the very nature of multinational firm operations generates
additional profit over what would occur with strictly arm’slength transactions between unaffiliated entities. Theories of
multinational firms emphasize that they arise in part due to
organizational and internalization advantages relative to purely
domestic firms; such advantages imply that profit is generated
in part by internalizing transactions within the firm. Thus, with
firms that are truly integrated across borders, holding related
entities to an “arm’s-length” standard for the pricing of
intracompany transactions does not make sense, nor does
allocating income and expenses on a country-by-country basis.
Also, the current system is based on an artificial distinction
among legal entities. For example, companies are taxed
differently based on whether they employ subsidiaries or
branches; as one example, deferral of taxation on unrepatriated
profits is allowed for the former but not the later. Recently,
there has been an increasingly common use of hybrid entities
(treated as subsidiaries by one country and branches by another)
to achieve double non-taxation.
Another related problem is that the current system is based on
an increasingly artificial distinction between MNEs whose
parent is incorporated in a residence country and those whose
parent is incorporated elsewhere. The former, but not the latter,
are frequently subject to world-wide taxation with its attendant
complexities (primarily the foreign tax credit and CFC rules).
But in today’s world, this distinction is less and less meaningful
as the sources of capital, location of R&D, location of
production, and location of distribution of MNEs become
increasingly globalized. The current distinction has led to a
spate of inversion transactions, in which US-based MNEs
formally shift the location of incorporation of their parent
offshore without changing the location of any of their real
business activities.
4
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Second, the current system of international taxation creates an
artificial tax incentive to locate profits in low-tax countries, both
by locating real economic activities in such countries and by
shifting profits toward more lightly taxed locations. It is
apparent that U.S. multinational firms, for example, book
disproportionate amounts of profit in low-tax locations. Figure 1
shows the top ten profit locations for U.S. multinational firms in
2003, based on the share of worldwide (non-U.S.) profits earned
in each location. While some of the countries are places with a
large U.S. presence in terms of economic activity (the United
Kingdom, Canada, Germany, Japan), seven of the top-ten profit
countries are locations with very low effective tax rates.
The literature has consistently found that multinational firms are
sensitive to corporate tax rate differences across countries in
their financial decisions. Estimates from the literature suggest
that the tax base responds to changes in the corporate tax rate
with an average semi-elasticity of about -2; thus, countries with
high corporate tax rates are likely to gain revenue by lowering
their tax rate. 11 One recent study suggests that corporate
income tax revenues in the United States were approximately
35% lower due to income shifting in 2002.12
Third, the current system is absurdly complex. As Taylor notes,
observers have described the system as “a cumbersome creation
of stupefying complexity” with “rules that lack coherence and
often work at cross purposes.”13 Altshuler and Ackerman note
that observers testifying before the President’s Advisory Panel
11

See Ruud A. de Mooij, “Will Corporate Income Taxation Survive?” 153 De Economist 277 (2005),
for an overview of this literature.
12
This estimate is from Kimberly A Clausing, “Multinational Firm Tax Avoidance and U.S. Government
Revenue,” Working paper (2007). The calculation is based on a regression of U.S. multinational firm
affiliate profit rates on tax rate differences across countries.
13
Willard Taylor, Testimony before the President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform. March 31,
2005, Tax Notes (April 4, 2005) Doc 2005-6654.
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on Federal Tax Reform found the system “deeply, deeply
flawed”, noting that “It is difficult to overstate the crisis in the
administration of the international tax system of the United
States.”14
A large part of this crisis results from applying the current
Transfer Pricing Guidelines. The current regime consumes a
disproportionate share of both IRS and private sector resources.
For example, several recent Ernst and Young surveys of
multinational firms have concluded that “transfer pricing
continues to be, and will remain, the most important
international tax issue facing MNEs”.15 70% of their
respondents feel that transfer pricing documentation has become
more important in recent years, and 63% of respondents report
transfer pricing audit activity in the previous three years.
Opinions in transfer pricing cases run to hundreds of pages
each, and litigation involves billions of dollars in proposed
deficiencies, such as the recently settled Glaxo case ($9 billion
in proposed deficiency, settled for $3.4 billion) or the Aramco
advantage case (litigated and lost by the IRS, which asserted
deficiencies of over $9 billion). There is no indication that the
1994 regulations under IRC section 482 have abated this
trend.16 While there have been fewer decided cases than under
the pre-1994 regulations, this is because both taxpayers and the
IRS have been devoting enormous resources to settling these
controversies in the appeals process, in litigation or through
advance pricing agreements, while both sides have been wary of
losing a major court case.

14

Rosanne Altshuler and Jonathan Ackerman, “International Aspects of Recommendations from the
President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform.” International Tax Policy Forum Presentation, 2
December 2005.
15
Ernst and Young, “2005-2006 Global Transfer Pricing Surveys.” Available on-line at
www.ey.com/transferpricingsurvey; accessed Jan 4, 2007.
16
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The contemporaneous documentation rule adopted by Congress,
which requires taxpayers to develop documentation of their
transfer pricing methods at the time the transactions are
undertaken rather than when they are challenged on audit, as
well as the complexity of the new SA methods (such as the
Comparable Profits Method, or CPM), have led the major
accounting firms to develop huge databases and expertise in
preparing transfer pricing documentation for clients. This
imposes large costs on major US multinational corporations.17
Meanwhile, small and medium businesses, which cannot afford
the major accounting firms, are left to fend for themselves and
are frequently targeted for audits in which the IRS can employ
more sophisticated methods than the taxpayer because only the
IRS and the large accounting firms have the necessary data to
apply CPM. Thus, while the IRS continues to lose transfer
prices cases against major MNEs under the 1994 regulations
(e.g., Xilinx) or has to settle for less than half the proposed
deficiency in Glaxo, it is able to win cases against small and
medium firms on the basis of superior resources, rather than
greater substantive justification of its position.
Thus, we believe that if we were designing the system from
scratch, we would adopt as our starting point not SA, but
formulary apportionment (FA). FA has several advantages over
SA. First, FA aligns the international corporate tax system with
the reality of a truly global world economy. In a world where
most major corporations are MNEs, where 70% of U.S.
international trade is done by multinational firms, and where
many opportunities for tax avoidance have an international
dimension, the current system of corporate taxation is obsolete.
In particular, SA systems treat each affiliate of a multinational
firm as a distinct entity with its own costs and incomes.
17
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Allocating income and expenses across countries is both
complex and conceptually unsatisfactory, given that worldwide
income is generated by interactions between affiliates across
countries. Multinational firms exist in large part because these
interactions generate more income than would separate
domestic firms interacting at arms-length; thus, requiring firms
to allocate this additional income among domestic tax bases is
necessarily artificial and arbitrary, because it would by
definition disappear if the related entities operated at arm’s
length. Further, such allocation generates ample opportunity for
multinational firms to reduce worldwide tax burdens by shifting
income to more lightly taxed jurisdictions.
Under a FA system, tax liabilities are instead based on a
multinational firm’s global income, and the share that is taxed
by the national jurisdiction depends on the fraction of a firm’s
economic activity that occurs in a particular country. 18 Thus,
while a truly precise definition and measurement of economic
value is likely unattainable, FA provides a reasonable,
administrable, and conceptually satisfying compromise that
suits the nature of the global economy. Further, a FA system
does not create an artificial legal distinction among types of
firms, and whether multinational entities are organized as
subsidiaries, branches, or hybrid entities. Nor does an FA
system rely on an artificial distinction between MNEs whose
parent is incorporated in a particular residence jurisdiction and
MNEs whose parent is incorporated elsewhere.
The second advantage associated with the proposal is that it
eliminates the tax incentive to shift income to low-tax countries.
As income shifting incentives are an important part of the
overall tax incentive for locating operations in low-tax
countries, removing this incentive will also result in less tax18

How this fraction is determined depends on the formula, discussed below.
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distorted decisions regarding the location of economic activity.
Under FA, firms are taxed based on their global income. Thus,
accounting for the income earned in each country is no longer
necessary, and there is no way to lighten global tax burdens by
manipulating this accounting for tax purposes.
Under FA, there is no reason for the sort of profit distortions
that are so clearly visible in Figure 1. In addition, when firms
consider the tax advantages associated with operating in low-tax
countries, these advantages will be based simply on the lower
tax associated with their operations in such countries, rather
than additional advantages conferred due to the fact that real
operations in low-tax countries facilitate tax avoidance. Thus,
the adoption of FA should vastly reduce tax distortions to
multinational firm decision making.
Such changes in the taxation of international income ultimately
help governments set their tax policies more independently.
The wishes of voters in each government influence the ideal
size of government, required revenue needs, and the allocation
of the tax burden among subgroups within society. Under FA,
governments would be able to choose their own corporate tax
rate based on their assessment of these sorts of policy goals,
rather than the pressures of tax competition for an increasingly
mobile capital income tax base.
The third advantage associated with the proposal is the massive
increase in simplicity that this would enable for the international
tax system. To determine tax liability, there would be no need
to allocate income or expenses among countries, resulting in far
lighter compliance burden for firms. CFC rules and the foreign
tax credit, which are both hugely complicated and a major
source of transaction costs for MNEs, are no longer necessary,
since there is no deferral under this system (which is essentially
territorial and treats all MNEs alike).
9
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Further, the likely administrative savings from abandoning the
current cumbersome transfer pricing regime are huge. By
contrast to the current regime, FA is relatively simple since all
that it requires is (1) establishing which businesses are unitary
and (2) establishing destination of arm’s-length sales of goods
or services.19 Once these two elements are established, the
resulting formula permits both taxpayers and the tax authorities
to determine to correct tax liability to each jurisdiction that uses
FA. This means that there is no longer a need to allocate or
apportion expenses (a source of major complexity in the current
rules, as the US 861 regulations indicate), because all a business
needs is to calculate its world-wide net income (worldwide
gross income minus worldwide expenses). This net income is
then allocated to various jurisdictions based on a single formula,
the tax rate of each jurisdiction is applied to the allocated
income, and the tax is paid.
For small and medium businesses in particular, FA results in
major cost savings as well as the likelihood of paying less tax
(since such businesses are rarely in a position to take on the IRS
under SA). For major multinational firms, FA also offers the
prospect of avoiding the costs of contemporaneous
documentation, and while some firms may pay more tax than
under SA, many would welcome the opportunity of paying a
single, low rate to each jurisdiction they do business in
(especially if the adoption of FA is coupled with a reduction in
the corporate rate), instead of having to cope with the
complexities and costs of SA.
3. Progress Toward FA, 1995-2007

19
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see Michael C. Durst, A Statutory Proposal for U.S. Transfer Pricing Reform, Tax Notes Int’l 1041 (June 4,
2007).
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But, it will be argued right away, we are not working on a clean
slate: SA is the international norm, and FA is anathema to the
OECD. Thus, we must work within the confines of SA,
whatever its disadvantages.
But is this really still true? We would argue that developments
since the adoption of the revised Transfer Pricing Guidelines in
1995 have made a consensual shift to FA much more likely.
First, one needs to recognize that the Transfer Pricing
Guidelines themselves represent a crucial step forward because
they adopt two methods (TNMM and profit split) that are not
based on strictly defined comparables. As we have argued
elsewhere, once strict comparability is abandoned, the term
“arm’s length” can be applied to any transfer pricing method,
including FA. 20 That is because in the absence of comparables,
no one can know what unrelated parties would have done, and
thus any result is an arm’s length result. Thus, as stated in 1993
by senior officials of the United States Treasury, the United
Kingdom Inland Revenue, the Fiscal Affairs Division of the
OECD and the Japanese National Tax Administration:
“[T]he arm's length principle and formulary apportionment
should not be seen as polar extremes; rather, they should be
viewed as part of a continuum of methods ranging from CUP
to predetermined formulas. It is not clear where the arm's
length principle ceases and formulary apportionment begins,
and it is counterproductive and unimportant to attempt to
apply labels to the methods.”21
Second, recent developments in the EU (which now represents a
majority in the OECD) have cast doubt about the opposition of
20

Avi-Yonah, Rise and Fall, supra.
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21
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certain traditional opponents of FA to that method. In particular,
the work on the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base
(CCCTB), which is scheduled to lead to a concrete proposal by
2010, is based on FA. 22 Of course, the CCCTB proposal faces
difficult political obstacles, is only intended to apply within the
EU, and is currently voluntary. However, the work so far shows
that a significant portion of EU Member States, including some
traditional opponents of FA like Germany, now believe that FA
is the direction of future development.
Third, the U.S. has been at the forefront of adopting formulary
methods, both in the context of allocating expenses (e.g., the
interest allocation regulations) and income (e.g., the global
trading regulations). Moreover, the U.S. approach to transfer
pricing has since 1995 been closer in practice to FA (the CPM is
more formulary than TNMM, and the US profit split is
equivalent in practice to FA with the location of R&D
determining the formula). Recent policy work by the Hamilton
Project, the major Democratic think tank for the 2008 election,
has supported FA, which has gained adherents such as former
Treasury Secretaries Robert Rubin and Larry Summers. 23
Thus, we believe that if the OECD were to shift course and start
working on an FA proposal for Article 7, this could have the
support of both the US and a large number of EU members.
That is particularly true if the proposal could be implemented
within the existing language of Article 7.
4. Is FA Compatible with the OECD MC?
Some have argued that tax treaties will need modification with
adoption of FA. However, it is not clear to us that existing tax
22

European Commission, The Mechanism for Sharing the CCCTB, CCCTB\WP\047\doc\en (2006);
Christoph Spengel, The Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (2007).
23
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treaties will have to be renegotiated. Transfer pricing is
currently governed by Article 9 of the treaties, which assumes
the SA method because it addresses the commercial or financial
relations between associated enterprises. If FA were adopted,
Article 9 would become irrelevant in those situations to which
FA applies (i.e., where a unitary business is found to exist)
because FA ignores the transactions between related parties, and
treats them instead as part of a single enterprise.
Instead, FA would be governed by Article 7. Under Article 5(7),
“[t]he fact that a company that is a resident of a Contracting
State controls or is controlled by a company that is a resident of
the other Contracting State … shall not constitute either
company a permanent establishment of the other.” However, it
is well established that a dependent agent can be a permanent
establishment (see Art. 5(5)), and whether an agent is dependent
is based on whether the principal exercises legal and economic
control over the agent. “An agent that is subject to detailed
instructions regarding the conduct of its operations or
comprehensive control by the enterprise is not legally
independent.”24
In the case of a modern, integrated MNE that operates as a
unitary business, a strong argument can be made that the parent
of the MNE exercises both legal and economic control over the
operations of the subsidiaries, especially where the subsidiaries
bear no real risk of loss and acquire goods and services
exclusively or near exclusively from the parent or other related
corporations. In that case, the subsidiaries should be regarded as
dependent agents of the parent. Such a finding is in fact made
with increasing frequency in both developed and developing
countries. 25
24

U.S. Treasury. Technical Explanation of United States Model Income Tax Convention. Washington:
Government Printing Office, Art. 5(6) (2006).
25
LeGall, supra.
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If the subsidiary is an agent of the parent, Art. 7(2) of the
treaties requires the attribution of the same profits to the
subsidiary “that it might be expected to make if it were a
distinct and independent enterprise engaged in the same or
similar activities under the same or similar conditions.”
Arguably, the application of FA satisfies this arm’s length
condition because in the absence of precise comparables (which
almost never exist) it is not possible to determine exactly what
profits would have been attributable to the subsidiary under SA.
When the US adopted CPM and profit split in the 1994 transfer
pricing regulations, some countries objected that it was violating
the treaties because these methods did not rely on exact
comparables to find the arm’s length price. However, these
objections soon subsided, and even the OECD endorsed similar
methods in its transfer pricing guidelines. The US always
maintained that both CPM and profit split satisfy the arm’s
length standard despite the lack of precise comparables (and in
the case of profit split, using no comparables at all to allocate
any residual profits). Similarly, the US has maintained that the
“super-royalty rule” of IRC sec. 482 (which requires royalties to
be “commensurate with the income” from an intangible, and
therefore subject to periodic adjustment) is consistent with the
arm’s length standard, even though no comparables can be
found to show that such adjustments are ever made by unrelated
parties.
In addition, if OECD members were to adopt FA, they could
argue that this is compatible with the language of OECD MC
Art. 7(4):
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“Insofar as it has been customary in a Contracting State to
determine the profits to be attributed to a permanent
establishment on the basis of an apportionment of the total
profits of the enterprise to its various parts, nothing in
paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from
determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment
as may be necessary; the method of apportionment adopted
shall, however, be such that the result shall be in accordance
with the principles contained in this Article.”
This language is found in many existing tax treaties based on
the OECD and UN models, and it can be used by OECD
members as a basis for applying FA under their domestic law,
without resort to a treaty override.
5. Conclusion: Toward a New Mechanism for Taxing Business
Profits at Source
We thus believe that rather than finalizing the current OECD
Report, the OECD should abandon its effort to apply obsolete
Article 9 SA concepts to PEs. Instead, it should work on
designing a workable FA approach within the context of current
Article 7. Article 9 can be left to apply only to those situations
in which a business is not unitary.
Adopting FA requires resolution of difficult issues. First, the
OECD would need to define a unitary business. We believe that
relying on the current treaty language of legal and economic
dependency, plus a test based on control (>50% of vote or
value) and a de minimis threshold of related party transactions
would be adequate in most cases.
Second, the common tax base to be apportioned needs to be
agreed on. The EU work on the CCCTB and progress toward
international adoption of IFRS both can help in this regard.
15
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Third and most importantly, the formula needs to be
determined. We have advocated a sales-based formula because
of the likelihood that countries can adopt it without
coordination, like destination basis for VAT.26 Sales are also
less susceptible to tax-motivated shifting than assets or payroll
(the other elements in the traditional U.S. state formula). But
within the OECD there is scope for negotiations on other
formulas, including functional analysis based on personnel,
assets and sales (as in the global trading regulations and the
OECD Report).
Finally, we believe that in the future the text of Article 5 needs
to be revamped so that it fits modern business realities. In
particular, we would advocate a numerical threshold, rather than
one based on a physical PE.27 But that is a topic for another day.

26

See Avi-Yonah and Clausing, supra.
See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, International Taxation of Electronic Commerce, 52 Tax L. Rev. 507 (1997);
Brian J. Arnold, Threshold requirements for taxing profits under tax treaties, in Brian Arnold, Jacques
Sasseville and Eric Zolt (eds.), The Taxation of Business Profits under Tax Treaties (2003); Dale Pinto,
The Need to Reconceptualize the Permanent Establishment Threshold, 60 Bulletin for Int’l Taxation 206
(2006).
27
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Figure 1: Where Were the Profits in 2003?
(profits as a percentage of the worldwide total)
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Notes: In 2003, majority-owned affiliates of U.S. multinational firms earned $326
billion of net income. This figure shows percentages of the worldwide (non-U.S.)
total net income occurring in each of the top-10 income countries. Thus, each
percentage point translates into approximately $3.3 billion of net income. Effective
tax rates are calculated as foreign income taxes paid relative to net (pre-tax) income.
Data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) web page; 2003 is the most
recent year with revised data available. The Bureau of Economic Analysis conducts
annual surveys of Operations of U.S. Parent Companies and Their Foreign Affiliates.
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